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Lawyering in a Vacuum 
James A. Cohen∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
1
 
I became particularly interested in the lawyering challenges 
facing lawyers when dealing with clients who are detainees held at the 
United States’ military base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,
2
  in 2006 
when two colleagues
3
 and I began representing several of the men 
detained there.
4
  This Essay is an attempt to identify the challenges 
faced by the lawyers who have volunteered to represent detainees, 
and an effort to offer some modest suggestions for improving the 
representation of similar clients. 
In 2007, I was one of the first lawyers to visit Camp 6 at the de-
tention camp in Guantánamo Bay.  The military had just opened 
Camp 6, a new prison in the high security prison facility.
5
  Cells com-
prised of floor-to-ceiling solid metal walls with no windows except for 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law.  Professor 
Cohen teaches Professional Responsibility, Psychology and the Law, and the Federal 
Litigation Clinic.  Special thanks to Katherine Kikes, Kelsey Ripper, Kevin Wakefield, 
and Amanda Zifchak. 
 1 Writing about representing detainees at Guantánamo is very much an exercise 
in shooting at a moving target.  Though the target is not especially fast moving, it is 
moving fast enough to make what one says at one moment accurate and yet not 
completely accurate at the next moment.   
 2 The Bush administration chose the base at Guantánamo because it was be-
lieved to be outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. judicial system.  See ANDY 
WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES: THE STORIES OF THE 774 DETAINEES IN 
AMERICA’S ILLEGAL PRISON xii (2007). 
 3 Along with my colleagues Professor Martha Rayner, who also teaches at Ford-
ham University School of Law, and Ramzi Kassem, who now teaches at CUNY School 
of Law, we began representing four men held at the military camp in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba.  
 4 Once the detainees arrived at Guantánamo, lawyers lead by those at the Center 
for Constitutional Rights (CCR) asserted that the detainees had rights including the 
right to counsel.  See Peter Margulies, The Detainees Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of 
Advocacy Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 369 (2009).  Much litiga-
tion began and still continues.  Thus far, at a minimum and possibly only for the 
time being, the litigation has resulted in the detainees being allowed to have counsel. 
 5 James A. Cohen, Cleared Men, Harsh Facility; Camp 6 at Guantanamo, 29 NAT. L.J. 
22, 22 (2007). 
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a strip of glass looking out on to the prison corridor.  For twenty-two 
hours a day, detainees were kept in these blocks with no human con-
tact or exposure to natural light.  For the remaining two hours of the 
day, the guards transferred the detainees in shackles and hoods to a 
twelve-by-nine-foot barbed wire pen where they received their only 
human interaction from other detainees in adjoining pens, save for 
the heavily censored mail sent by their families and letters from their 
lawyers.  Because solitary confinement was the norm, any extra discip-
line was administered in the form of a diet of bread and raisins for 
three days, bread alone for thirty days, confiscation of the detainees’ 
undershirts, the cutting of their beards, or confiscation of their Qu-
rans. 
The conditions were oppressive and punitive—more oppressive 
than the conditions in a maximum-security prison in the United 
States—though nearly twenty-five percent of Guantánamo’s inhabi-
tants had essentially been declared to no longer be dangerous to the 
United States or the Coalition, to no longer be intelligence assets, 
and were awaiting repatriation to their home country.
6
  In fact, of the 
several hundred men imprisoned at Guantánamo, only ten were 
charged under the first military commission system, which was invali-
dated by the Supreme Court, and only three of the sixty to eighty 
men whom the government claimed it was going to charge had their 
cases resolved.
7
  That left over 200 men in the harshest prison known 
to the United States without any clear indication as to whether they 
would even be charged.
8
 
On March 7, 2011, four years after my visit, President Obama au-
thorized the indefinite detention of enemy combatants,
9
 legitimizing 
 
 6 Id.   
 7 Devon Chaffee, Military Commissions Revived: Persisting Problems of Perception, 9 
U.N.H. L. REV. 237, 237–38 (2011).  
 8 Now there are about 171 detainees at Guantánamo, which includes approx-
imately forty-five to fifty detainees whom the government has determined it will not 
charge, but whom it will keep in custody indefinitely.  The Guantánamo Docket: A His-
tory of the Detainee Population, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo 
(last updated Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter The Detainees]. As of June 2011, there is a 
new prosecutor in charge of the Military Commission process.  It is the first time that 
a general has been in charge and the expectation is that he was put in charge to ac-
celerate prosecutions.  Peter Finn, Pentagon Names New Guanátnamo Prosecutor, WASH. 
POST (June 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-
security/pentagon-names-new-guantanamoprosecutor/2011/06/23/AGlp73hH_ 
story.html. 
 9 See Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Allows Indefinite Detention, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 8, 2011, at A1. 
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a policy that denies detainees traditional due process rights but still 
allows them legal representation.
10
  The story of lawyering for clients 
at Guantánamo has evolved in many ways between 2006 and the 
summer of 2011.  The law has changed from explicitly stating that the 
detainees have very minimal rights under the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006,
11
 to U.S. Supreme Court decisions permitting detainees 
to file for writs of habeas corpus,
12
 to the Military Commission Act of 
2009,
13
 which bars the use of coerced statements as evidence. 
Relationships with clients have evolved as well.  At the begin-
ning, “humanity” was the only common ground.  Given the lack of le-
gal progress, some clients have given up and refuse to see their law-
yers, while some others have established a meaningful attorney-client 
relationship.  Others are in between.  For the attorney presented with 
the unprecedented task of representing these clients, the govern-
ment’s interests necessarily conflict with the detainee’s interest.  Of-
ten, the lawyer’s usual practices are stymied by an uncooperative ad-
ministration, rejected by the client, and scorned by members of the 
American public and military, who see representation of enemy com-
batants as an act of disloyalty.
14
  The legal community faces the quan-
dary of defending accused terrorists without the traditional features 
of the American criminal justice system or even the expectation of 
justice, as if participating in a different legal system entirely.  With lit-
tle support and almost no direction, the detainee advocate is lawyer-
ing in a vacuum. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. My Experience 
I have simultaneously taught and practiced law full-time for the 
past three decades.  My teaching and practice overlap considerably 
because the majority of my teaching time is spent representing, with 
my students, clients charged with federal crimes.  We represent the 
client from arrest until the conclusion of the case, which includes ne-
 
 10 See William Glaberson, Many Detainees at Guantánamo Rebuff Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 5, 2007, at A1 (describing the difficulties of legal representation). 
 11 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 12 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 13 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (Supp. III 2009). 
 14 See, e.g., John Heilprin, Views on Detainee Representation Draw Fire, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 14, 2007, at A5. 
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cessary appeals.  I have tried to verdict more than one hundred jury 
trials and have argued appeals in the U. S. Supreme Court, the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Ap-
peals.  Despite this wealth of experience and the luxury of working 
with very smart and eager law students in an environment that affords 
opportunity for reflection, the representation of clients detained in 
Guantánamo presents unique challenges. 
None of the lawyering models that we teach, study, and practice
15
 
seem to be a comfortable fit.  Perhaps the criminal defense paradigm 
is the model that seems closest because I have an extensive back-
ground in the subject and the detainees are imprisoned.
16
  But the 
comparison to criminal defendants starts and ends with that fact.  
The differences between criminal practice and representing detai-
nees are truly staggering. 
B. The Clients 
It has been reported that 779 detainees have passed through 
Guantánamo since January 11, 2002.
17
  While approximately 600 de-
tainees have since been repatriated or transferred to other countries, 
at least 171 detainees remain in U.S. custody.
18
  The detainees have 
been exclusively male and the majority of them—542—have been 
brought to Guantánamo from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and 
 
 15 See generally ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, 
COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); DAVID 
A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2004); 
STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING (2009); Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Law-
yer-Client Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755 (2004).  See 
discussion infra notes 110–16116 & accompanying text. 
 16 “The criminal law paradigm is now, and has been from the beginning, the 
right one to apply to the fight against terrorism.”  Eric M. Freedman, Who’s Afraid of 
the Criminal Law Paradigm in the “War on Terror?”, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 323, 323 (2007). 
 17 The Detainees, supra note 8.  January 11, 2002, saw the first twenty prisoners ar-
rive in Guantánamo by plane.  JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 63 (2006).  
 18 The Detainees, supra note 8.  Additionally, eight detainees have died in deten-
tion at Guantánamo, the latest reported death occurred in May 2011.   Afghan Prison-
er at Guantanamo Dies in Apparent Suicide, REUTERS, May 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/19/us-usa-guantanamo-death-
idUSTRE74I04I20110519 (“Inayatullah is the eighth prisoner to die at the detention 
center . . . .”).  
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Pakistan.
19
  Citizens of an additional forty-four countries have been 
held at Guantánamo, including one U.S. citizen.
20
 
It is understandably difficult for an American lawyer to gain the 
trust of detainees—most of whom have been unjustly held by the mil-
itary, tortured, and neglected by doctors.
21
  Also challenging the 
American lawyer is the fact that the detainees come predominantly 
from countries where the lawyer-client relationship is either non-
existent or at the least very different than the one that exists in the 
United States.  Virtually none of the detainees come from countries 
with legal systems that are adversarial in nature.
22
  Accordingly, many 
detainees are unable to separate the interest of their legal advocate 
from the interest of the government or the prison guard. 
Before reaching Guantánamo, many detainees spent months or 
years in secret U.S. detention facilities near the Afghan cities of Kan-
dahar and Bagram.
23
  The reports of detainee treatment at Kandahar 
and Bagram are nothing short of horrifying: detainees were subjected 
to harsh interrogation tactics; psychological and physical torture,
24
 in-
 
 19 The Detainees, supra note 8.   
 20 Id.  Yaser Esam Hamdi, a dual citizen of the United States and Saudi Arabia, 
was released and transferred to the United States on April 5, 2002.  The Guantánamo 
Docket: Yaser Esam Hamdi, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/9-yaser-esam-hamdi (last vi-
sited Sept. 25, 2011).  
 21 See, e.g., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, CURRENT CONDITIONS OF 
CONFINEMENT AT GUANTÁNAMO (2009) available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_Report_Conditions_At_Guantanamo.pdf. 
 22 See Frank E. Vogel, The Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 53, 55–56 (2002). 
 23 See, e.g., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, ABANDONED AT GUANTÁNAMO 11 
(2008), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Guant%C3%83%C2%A1namo%27s%20Refugees%203d
%20ed%20_FINAL_.pdf.  
 24 The statute defines torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the 
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person 
within his custody or physical control.”  18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006).  And it defines 
“severe mental pain or suffering” as  
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from— (A) the in-
tentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or 
suffering; (B) the administration or application, or threatened admin-
istration or application, of mind-altering substances or other proce-
dures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(C) the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another per-
son will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suf-
fering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances 
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cluding waterboarding,
25
 stress positions, and strip searches; terro-
rized by attack dogs; and verbally threatened with rape and death.
26
  
Guards intentionally desecrated the Quran by sitting on it, kicking it, 
and even dropping it into a latrine bucket.
27
  Interrogators told detai-
nees that they would spend the rest of their lives in Bagram or Kan-
dahar and Guantánamo.
28
  A detainee who was later released ex-
 
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or per-
sonality.   
Id. § 2340(2).   
 25 The purpose of waterboarding is to induce the body’s physical response to 
drowning.  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to John Rizzo, Act-
ing Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency 11 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/zubaydah.pdf (“As we understand it, when 
the waterboard is used, the subject’s body responds as if the subject were drowning—
even though the subject may be well aware that he is in fact not drowning.”).  Here is 
the CIA’s description of the procedure, according to John Bybee’s memorandum: 
In this procedure, the individual is bound securely to an inclined 
bench, which is approximately four feet by seven feet.  The individual’s 
feet are generally elevated.  A cloth is placed over the forehead and 
eyes.  Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner.  As 
this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and 
mouth.  Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth 
and nose, air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the 
presence of the cloth.  This causes an increase in carbon dioxide level 
in the individual’s blood.  This increase in the carbon dioxide level 
stimulates increased effort to breathe.  This effort plus the cloth pro-
duces the perception of “suffocation and incipient panic,” i.e., the per-
ception of drowning.   
Id. at 3–4.  What could be a clearer definition of the “threat of imminent death” than 
a body’s physical reaction to imminent death?   
     Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has denied that military personnel 
ever engaged in waterboarding, but there is evidence of “water torture” and other 
uses of water for the same purpose and same effect—simulated drowning—at Guan-
tánamo, which is run by the U.S. military.  See Truthout Contributor Jeffrey Kaye on Guan-
tánamo Water Torture and Rumsfeld’s Denials, PUB. RECORD (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://pubrecord.org/multimedia/9597/truthout-contributor-jeffrey-Guantánamo; 
see also CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON TORTURE, CRUEL, INHUMAN AND 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA 28 (2006), available 
at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf 
 26 LAUREL E. FLETCHER ET AL., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GUANTÁNAMO 
AND ITS AFTERMATH: U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON FORMER DETAINEES 17, 18–26 (2008) (quoting MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., REPORT ON 
GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 15 (2011), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_GTMO_And_Its_Aftermath_0.pdf. 
 27 Id. at 22–23. 
 28 Id. at 26.   
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pressed the following: “‘I felt I would be much luckier if I died. . . .  
[T]here was no law there.’”
29
 
These detention centers were often the second stop on the way 
to Guantánamo; many detainees were first kept for several weeks or 
months in a “Prison of Darkness.”
30
  Men were held there in dark cells 
with deafening music playing day and night.
31
  The guards’ faces were 
always covered, and one former detainee was told that he was being 
held somewhere “where no one knew[] where [he was]  and [where] 
no one [was] going to defend [him].”
32
  Men disappeared into these 
“dark prisons.”
33
  Many of those who survived—some detainees were 
in fact killed in custody
34
—were drugged, chained, and, eventually, 
boarded onto Cuba-bound planes.
35
 
In attempts to secure intelligence, interrogators exploit the de-
tainees’ lack of understanding of the American criminal justice sys-
tem.  It was common for interrogators to falsely claim to be the detai-
nees’ lawyers.
36
  This is meant to manipulate the cultural differences 
because detainees already oftentimes think that their lawyers are FBI 
or CIA agents.
37
  Assigning military lawyers, who dress in uniforms 
similar to the guards’, to represent detainees is equally troubling, as 
many detainees assume that the attorneys work for the government 
and not for them.
38
  Other policies attempt to deter the detainees 
from using legal assistance in the first place.  Interrogators have been 
known to lie to detainees that their lawyers are either Jewish or ho-
mosexual, exploiting prejudices that the detainees might have against 
these groups.
39
 
Many of the countries from which the detainees come have legal 
systems based wholly on Islamic law or systems that combine civil and 
 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 20. 
 31 Id. 
 32 FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 20. 
 33 U.S. Operated Secret ‘Dark Prison’ in Kabul, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 19, 2005), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/12/18/us-operated-secret-dark-prison-kabul. 
 34 FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 23–24.  Military autopsies on the deaths of Mullah 
Habibullah and a taxi driver named Dilawar reported blunt force injuries to the low-
er extremities and determined the deaths to be homicides.  Id. at 23. 
 35 Id. at 27–28. 
 36 David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 
1994 (2008). 
 37 Id.  
 38 Glaberson, supra note 10. 
 39 Id.  
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Islamic religious law.
40
  Traditional Islamic law does not require or 
provide attorneys for criminal defendants,
41
 although many of these 
countries now allow attorneys to participate in legal proceedings.
42
  
For the most part, detainees know little about their home legal sys-
tems and little about the American legal system. 
Virtually all of the detainees are Muslim.
43
  Few of the lawyers, 
however, are Muslim.  The lawyers and the clients are unfamiliar with 
one another; for most of the lawyers, their clients’ cultures, economic 
status, legal systems, everyday lives, religious beliefs, political and go-
vernmental structures are completely or mostly unknown.  And, vice 
versa.  All of these factors make the establishment of a meaningful at-
torney-client relationship especially difficult. 
Although there are no official statistics for the country of Yemen, 
its Muslim population is estimated at nearly one hundred percent.
44
  
Thirty of the forty-eight countries represented by Guantánamo detai-
nees have Muslim populations of fifty percent or more; fifteen of 
those countries have Muslim populations of ninety-five percent or 
more and they represent 631 of the 779 detainees who have passed 
through Guantánamo.
45
 
 
 40 The World Factbook: Legal System, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
fact-
book/fields/2100.html?countryName=Saudi%20Arabia&countryCode=sa&regionCo
de=me&#sa (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 41 See Vogel, supra note 22, at 55–56 (explaining that in classical Islamic courts 
defendants were not represented by attorneys, but now defense attorneys, in theory, 
are allowed in nearly all Muslim countries). 
 42 Id. 
 43 According to the CIA’s World Factbook, ninety-five percent of all Pakistanis are 
Muslim, ninety-nine percent of Afghans, and one hundred percent of Saudis.  The 
World Factbook: Religions: Saudi Arabia, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
fact-
book/fields/2122.html?countryName=Saudi%20Arabia&countryCode=sa&regionCo
de=me&#sa (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 44 Yemen, U.S. DEP’T  STATE, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ 
2008/108496.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); see also The World Factbook: Yemen, 
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ym.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); 
 45 The Guantánamo Docket: Countries of Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/by-country (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011); The World Factbook: Religions: Yemen, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
fact-
book/fields/2122.html?countryName=Yemen&countryCode=ym&regionCode=me&
#ym (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).  
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Most of the detainees at Guantánamo were not captured directly 
by U.S. forces or during conventional battle.
46
  Almost eighty percent 
of Guantánamo detainees were seized by the Northern Alliance, tri-
bal warlords, or Pakistani intelligence officers.
47
  Instead of battle-
fields, they were plucked out of villages, mosques, and homes.
48
  The 
U.S. military “had no choice but to rely on local intelligence” to help 
them find and remove alleged al Qaeda and Taliban fighters from 
Iraq and Afghanistan.
49
  In Afghanistan—a country saturated with tri-
bal feuds and inter-ethnic bloodshed—much of the gathered intelli-
gence was worthless and the Army received tips that “were nothing 
more than attempts by one tribe to retaliate against another.”
50
  Some 
detainees who have since been released have said that “personal 
feuds or failure to pay bribes to local officials led to their arrests” and 
long-term detentions.
51
 
The majority of these men were not fighters for—or even affi-
liated with—al Qaeda or the Taliban.  Men of ages fourteen to eigh-
ty—farmers, taxi drivers, and many unwilling Taliban recruits—were 
taken to Guantánamo.
52
  Some were coerced through enhanced in-
terrogation techniques or bribed into lying to interrogators about the 
terrorist activities of fellow detainees.
53
  For these reasons, many of 
those who were eventually released had been wrongfully imprisoned 
in the first place.
54
 
Starting in 2002, detainees went on hunger strikes to protest 
their harsh treatment and imprisonment without charges.
55
  The mili-
 
 46 MARGULIES, supra note 17, at 69. 
 47 Id; see also Peter Jan Honigsberg, Inside Guantánamo, 10 NEV. L.J. 82, 94 (2009). 
 48 Id.  
 49 MARGULIES,  supra note 17, at 68. 
 50 Id. 
 51 FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 18. 
 52 Andy Worthington, The Hidden Horrors of WikiLeaks’ Guantánamo Files, ANDY 
WORTHINGTON (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2011/04/27/the-hidden-horrors-of-wikileaks-
guantanamo-files [hereinafter Worthington, Hidden Horrors]. 
 53 Andy Worthington, WikiLeaks Reveals Secret Guantánamo Files, Exposes Detention 
Policy as a Construct of Lies, ANDY WORTHINGTON (Apr. 25, 2011), 
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2011/04/25/wikileaks-reveals-secret-
guantanamo-files-exposes-detention-policy-as-a-construct-of-lies [hereinafter Wor-
thington, Wikileaks Reveals]. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Kevin Gosztola, The Hunger Strikers of Guantanamo as Detailed in Files Released by 
WikiLeaks, FIREDOGLAKE (May 4, 2011, 12:48 PM), 
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tary’s response to these and other “revolt strategies” has been harsh.  
In 2006, the government, in accordance with Joint Task Force Guan-
tánamo policy, authorized the forced insertion of feeding tubes to 
prevent protesters from dying and sullying the image of the military.
56
  
In many cases, doctors neglected to report injuries or psychological 
disorders with clear links to torture and did not inquire as to their 
causes.
57
  One journalist explained, “In my mind the physicians 
turned a blind eye.  My suspicion is that clinicians were aware on 
some level of mistreatment, at least the possibility of mistreatment, 
and for whatever reason—fear, orders from superiors—they didn’t 
want to take their clinical encounters in that direction.”
58
  In addition 
to physical maladies, a significant portion of the Guantánamo popu-
lation suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, 
memory loss, and paranoia, though many are so distrustful of prison 
personnel that they fail to seek treatment.
59
 
Professors Mark Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux, and students of 
Seton Hall University School of Law complied a status report on the 
detainees using solely U.S. government documents in 2006.
60
  The sta-
tus report revealed that fifty-five percent of the detainees had not 
committed any hostile acts against the United States or its coalition 
allies.
61
  Only eight percent of the detainees were “characterized as al 
Qaeda fighters.”
62
  Forty percent had no affiliation with al Qaeda and 
eighteen percent had no affiliation with either al Qaeda or the Tali-
ban.
63
 
Most detainees were seized and held by mistake.
64
  During the 
months after September 11, 2001, the United States “dropped leaflets 
promising generous rewards for ‘al-Qaeda and Taliban murderers.’”
65
  
 
http://my.firedoglake.com/kgosztola/2011/05/04/the-hunger-strikers-of-
guantanamo-as-detailed-in-files-released-by-wikileaks. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Courtney Hutchison, Guantanamo Docs Neglected, Concealed Medical Evidence of 
Torture, Study Finds, ABC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/guantanamo-docs-neglected-
concealed-medical-evidence-torture-study/story?id=13460240. 
 58 Id. 
 59 David J. R. Frakt, The Difficulty of Defending Detainees, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 381, 394 
(2009). 
 60 DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 26. 
 61 Id. at 2. 
 62 Id. (emphasis added). 
 63 Id.  
 64 See Worthington, Wikileaks Reveals, supra note 53. 
 65 FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 17 (quoting DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 26, at 15). 
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The cash incentive caused local militia and village leaders in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan to seize men and turn them over to the Pakistani 
army without proof of terrorist affiliations.
66
  The army then turned 
over 369 “suspects” to the CIA, receiving compensation of up to 
$5,000 for each man.
67
 
C. The Lawyers 
When the prison at Guantánamo was first established in 2002, 
the organized bar avoided direct involvement with the legal issues 
presented by the detention of so-called “enemy combatants.”
68
  The 
first lawyers to become involved with the representation of Guantá-
namo detainees were death penalty lawyers and civil rights activists, 
such as Clive Stafford Smith and Joseph Margulies.
69
  Together with 
the CCR,
70
 these lawyers advocated for the rule of law in the after-
math of September 11, 2001.
71
  These lawyers viewed the detention of 
“enemy combatants” at Guantánamo as an issue of great constitution-
al importance. 
Within a few years, the American Bar Association (ABA) and 
“mainstream” lawyers became increasingly involved in the representa-
tion of detainees.
72
  Many of these lawyers have come from some of 
the biggest law firms in the United States.
73
  The lawyers who have vo-
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Peter Margulies, The Detainees Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strat-
egies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 369 (2009). 
 69 Id.  
 70 The CCR is a non-profit legal organization which aims to protect the rights 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
About CCR, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://www.ccrjustice.org (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011).  Since September 11, 2001, CCR has brought several cases challenging the 
Bush administration’s detention and interrogation policies during the “War on Ter-
ror.”  See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004).  
 71 Margulies, supra note 68, at 369. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Some of the law firms participating include: Perkins Coie; Shearman & Ster-
ling; Proskauer Rose; Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw; Blank Rome; Manatt, Phelps & 
Phillips; Allen & Overy; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; Hunton & Wil-
liams; Holland & Hart; Dorsey & Whitney; and Covington & Burling.  Mark Den-
beaux & Christa Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client Relationship in Guantánamo Bay, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 491, 498–99 n.29 (2007).  I asked a senior litigation partner at 
one of these firms how corporate clients reacted to the fact that their law firm was 
involved in the Guantánamo litigation.  He responded that the corporate clients 
know better than anyone the importance of lawyers.  
COHEN_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2011  9:16 AM 
1438 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1427 
 
lunteered to represent those detained at Guantánamo come from 
every facet of the profession.  They include lawyers from medium and 
small firms,
74
 military lawyers, solo practitioners, law professors, and 
federal defenders.
75
  They also come from diverse specialties: criminal 
and civil litigation, transactional work, and subspecialties in substan-
tive areas.  Many lawyers began by representing more than one detai-
nee.
76
 
The representation of detainees by large firms drew the ire of 
certain government officials, notably Charles “Cully” Stimson, the 
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs.
77
  
Mr. Stimson stated in a 2007 interview that he was dismayed that law-
yers from such firms would choose to represent prisoners at Guantá-
namo, and that the firms’ corporate clients should consider ending 
their business relationships.
78
  Mr. Stimson withdrew these remarks 
and issued an apology after drawing considerable criticism from legal 
circles;
79
 he ultimately resigned over his statements.
80
  Mr. Stimson’s 
accusations that the Guantánamo defense attorneys are somehow 
“un-American” because they represent detainees exhibits one of the 
many challenges faced by these lawyers. 
D. Guantánamo Law 
The history of Guantánamo is unprecedented.  Congress passed 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists 
(AUMF) in the shadow of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks on the United States.  On September 18, 2001, Con-
gress enacted the AUMF allowing the President to use appropriate 
force against those who “planned, authorized, committed or aided 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 For a discussion regarding the challenges faced by military defense lawyers at 
Guantánamo, see Matthew Ivey, Challenges Presented to Military Lawyers Representing De-
tainees in the War on Terror, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (2010). 
 76 The cost of representation is borne entirely by the lawyer or the firm.  Costs 
include transportation (traveling to Guantánamo takes at least a full day depending 
on one’s departure point), food and lodging (actually inexpensive), interpreters 
($1,200 to $1,500 a day), and time away from the office.  Outsiders’ cellular and 
smart phones do not work at the base and email access is both limited and slow.   
 77 See Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2007, at A1. 
 78 Id.   
 79 See Heilprin, supra note 14. 
 80 See Donna Miles, Gates Recommends PACOM, NORTHCOM Successors; DoD Official 
Resigns, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Feb. 2, 2007), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2915.  
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the terrorist attacks.”
81
  In 2004, the Supreme Court held that the 
government was authorized to detain persons captured while fighting 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan for the duration of the conflict.
82
  The mili-
tary base at Guantánamo Bay was chosen by the Bush administration 
because it was believed to be outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. judi-
cial system.
83
  But later in 2004, the Supreme Court held that Guantá-
namo is not outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts.
84
  In reaction 
to this holding, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA 
or the “Act”) in 2005.
85
  This Act took away the jurisdiction of courts 
and granted exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit to review detainee status decisions 
made by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).
86
  Continu-
ing the tension between the judicial and legislative branches, the Su-
preme Court held that the DTA did not apply to pending habeas cas-
es at the time of enactment.
87
  Congress reacted by passing the Mili-
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) to eliminate jurisdiction 
over all pending and future causes of action brought by detainees.
88
  
In 2008, the Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that detainees 
at Guantánamo had a right to habeas corpus under the U.S. Constitu-
tion and that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of that 
right.
89
  Once President Obama took office, he requested that military 
judges suspend all war crime trials, a request with which they com-
plied.
90
  Lastly, in March 2011, President Obama lifted the suspension 
on military tribunals.
91
 
 
 81 Authorization to Use Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).  
 82 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
 83 See WORTHINGTON, supra note 2, at xii.  
 84 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
 85 Joseph R. Pope, Comment, The Lasting Viability of Rasul in the Wake of the Detai-
nee Treatment Act of 2005, 27 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 21, 28–31 (2006). 
 86 Id. at 28. 
 87 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 88 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C); see A. Hays Butler, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Boumediene v. Bush: 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 149, 152 (2008). 
 89 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 90 Peter Finn, Plan to Eliminate Prison Faces Hurdles, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2009, at 
A6. 
 91 Peter Grier, Obama Orders Guantánamo Tribunals to Resume.  Is He Abandoning 
His Pledge?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2011), 
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The only vehicle that could, at least theoretically, address what 
rights—if any—the detainees might have was the writ of habeas cor-
pus.
92
  The use of the writ, however, raised several questions, includ-
ing whether the protections of the U.S. Constitution—including the 
writ of habeas corpus—applied to foreign nationals held at Guantá-
namo.  In 2008, the Supreme Court held that constitutional protec-
tions did apply to these individuals, and that they could therefore pe-
tition for writs of habeas corpus.
93
 
While detainee treatment at Guantánamo enhances the existing 
distrust, government policies further prevent a lawyer from adequate-
ly performing his duties.  Upon his inauguration in January 2009, 
President Obama announced his plans to close Guantánamo, ban the 
use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and review the current 
Guantánamo detention policy.
94
  In May of that same year, however, 
the President announced that he would revamp rather than reject the 
Bush policy of trying detainees in military tribunals.
95
  On January 21, 
2010, the Obama administration then announced that, pursuant to a 
Justice Department-led task force’s findings, fifty of the 106 detainees 
would be held indefinitely.
96
  Only a handful of the detainees have 
been charged.  In January 2010, forty-seven uncharged detainees 
were deemed “too dangerous to release,” though the government was 
not forced to present evidence supporting this claim.
97
  Then, on 
March 7, 2011, President Obama formally authorized Guantánamo to 
detain prisoners indefinitely.
98
 
Other questions remain largely unanswered or unclear.  Namely, 
if the court found that the petition warranted relief, what relief was it 
empowered to grant?  What is the burden of proof: proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of 
 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0307/Obama-orders-Guantanamo-
tribunals-to-resume.-Is-he-abandoning-his-pledge.  
 92 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
 93 Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.  
 94 Guantanamo Bay Timeline, WASH. POST, 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/timeline/ (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Worthington, Hidden Horrors, supra note 52. 
 98 Exec. Order No. 13567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-
review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava; Grier, supra note 91. 
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the evidence, or “some evidence”?
99
  And who has it—the government 
or the petitioner?
100
  Who could be considered a petitioner, consider-
ing that in some instances a family member of a detainee authorized 
the petition—a so-called “next friend” petition—among others?
101
  
May he engage in taking depositions—if so, of whom?  Is the gov-
ernment required to turn over exculpatory information?
102
 
III. THE CHALLENGES THAT LAWYERS FACE WHEN REPRESENTING 
DETAINEES 
The first, most fundamental—and confounding—difference be-
tween Guantánamo and our criminal justice system is that there have 
been and are no charges!  Our two remaining clients
103
 have been de-
tained for more than nine years and neither has been charged.  In 
the United States, notice of the charges is the beginning of almost 
every criminal case.
104
  With this information, the attorney can begin 
the representation; without it, there is no real place to start.  But 
maybe that is not true.  In the United States, one could start with a 
description of the client’s rights and explain the process and proce-
dures that would follow.
105
  However, it was impossible to explain 
rights and procedures because for several years the law specifically 
provided that the detainees had no rights,
106
 and the then-restrictive 
 
 99 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 100 Id. 
 101 The government routinely disputed whether the lawyer was empowered or “au-
thorized” to act on behalf of a detainee.  Since agency law is a fundamental part of 
our legal system, the issue of authority to act is an entirely appropriate question to 
ask except when dealing with the detainees, given the circumstances discussed here-
in.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958).   
 102 As a practical matter, many judges have already ordered the government to 
turn over exculpatory evidence.  See, e.g., Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 
1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The district court’s Case Management Order (CMO) re-
quires the government to produce all ‘reasonably available’ exculpatory evidence . . . 
.”). 
 103 We represented two other detainees who were also not charged but were re-
turned to their home country.   
 104 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 3.  
 105 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5. 
 106 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733–36 (2008).  It was not until June 12, 
2008, that the Supreme Court granted Guantánamo detainees the protection of the 
Constitution, including the right to habeas corpus.  Id. at 795.  This officially gave 
prisoners the right to contest their detention, but the request for an official charge is 
still routinely ignored.  
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procedures outlined
107
 were later found to be unconstitutional.
108
  So 
what can the lawyer and the client talk about if and when the rela-
tionship reaches this level of trust? 
A serious challenge for the lawyers is simply explaining their 
presence to the detainees.  After all, virtually all of the lawyers are 
from the West: the place where the detainees’ captors come from.  
What distinguishes the lawyers from the captors?  This problem is 
compounded because, on occasion, guards have also told detainees 
that their lawyers will prevent them from going home.
109
 
The development of the relationship between the client and the 
attorney often hinges on which model the lawyer follows.  Since the 
late 1970’s, several lawyering models, in addition to the traditional 
“paternalistic” model, have become popular.
110
  The understanding of 
the paternalistic approach was strongly influenced by the conception 
of the lawyer as an expert.
111
  The lawyer was sought out for her ex-
pertise: once the lawyer was presented with the “problem” and solved 
it (i.e., provided her advice to the client) the client would follow it.
112
  
Counseling Guantánamo clients is not quite the same as counseling 
clients in the United States.  In the United States, a lawyer’s role is 
that of a “zealous advocate” for the client,
113 but it is difficult to be a 
zealous advocate when the landscape is so undefined. 
The adversarial system remains one of the hallmarks of the 
American conception of procedural justice.
114
  Since the 1980s, Amer-
ican lawyers have moved in the direction of a “client-centered” ap-
proach to legal representation,
115
 as opposed to a “paternalistic” ap-
proach, which was traditional.  The “client-centered” approach 
 
 107 See In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  
The restrictive procedures document, amended in 2008, provides that lawyers may 
gain access to their clients’ information on a “need to know” basis.  Id. at 175.    
 108 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 
 109 Luban, supra note 36, at 1996. 
 110 See generally Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Auton-
omy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 BYU L. REV. 307 (1997). 
 111 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958).  
 112 Id. 
 113 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) (“As advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); Id. at 
R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2002) (“A lawyer must also act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”).  
 114 See Alexandra D. Lahav, Portraits of Resistance: Lawyer Responses to Unjust Proceed-
ings, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 725, 781–82 (2010). 
 115 See Denbeaux & Boyd-Nafstad, supra note 73, at 494; see also Binder, supra note 
16. 
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involves the client in the decision-making process, and instructs that 
the lawyer’s central responsibility is “to enable the client to exercise 
his right to choose.”
116
  In the client-centered approach, the relation-
ship can become quite collaborative.  The acceptance of the client-
centered model reduces the prevalence of the attorney-centered (pa-
ternal) model of representation. 
As noted, there is little in common between most lawyers and 
clients and little common ground on which to build a meaningful at-
torney-client relationship.  And some lawyers have found the client-
centered model unsuited for the representation of Guantánamo de-
tainees.
117
  Consequently, the paternalistic model of attorney/client 
representation has become more common in the representation of 
detainees in Guantánamo.
118
 
The client-centered attorney-client relationship is frustrating for 
the Guantánamo lawyers because they are restricted in access to their 
clients and client information in ways that were not previously en-
countered.  Not only is access to clients difficult but it is limited by 
the time and cost of travel, the availability of space at the base, and 
the delays in mail service (early on in the representation, receiving 
mail could take several weeks each way).
119
  Distance, time, and the 
unavailability of modern methods of communication make it imposs-
ible to get timely decisions from the client. 
Though the world of habeas litigation can move quite slowly, 
that is not always so.  Sometimes decisions are needed quickly and the 
client may be inaccessible by virtue of distance, time, or disability.  
Disability, specifically the inability to make rational decisions, can be 
a consequence of PTSD because the various symptoms make it harder 
for the individual to make rational choices.  In these circumstances, 
who should make the decision? 
It is not uncommon for a client’s statements to be considered 
classified.  If classified, in order to discuss them with the client, a law-
 
 116 Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 717, 720 (1987). 
 117 See Denbeaux & Boyd-Nafstad, supra note 73, at 508. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Though mail service has improved (and in extreme emergencies a phone call 
might be approved), letters from the client (typically in Arabic) have to be translated 
by a privilege team into English so that classified information can be redacted before 
the letters are sent to the lawyer.  Letters from the lawyer have to be translated into 
the language of the client, sent to the privilege team for possible redaction, and then 
sent to the client.    
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yer has to seek permission from the government or the court.
120
  Of 
course, the lawyer is permitted to ask the client about his statements 
and the circumstances under which they were made.  Many clients, 
however, have made statements over several years while under ex-
treme conditions, and thus, their abilities to recall those statements 
are diminished by the passage of time and PTSD.
121
 
The habeas lawyer’s notes of client interviews have to be shared 
with a “privilege team”
122
 to determine whether they contain classified 
information.  If classified information is discovered, the notes are re-
dacted and the classified information becomes available only at the 
secure facility.
123
  In fact, motions containing classified information 
must be prepared at the secure facility and filed under seal.
124
   
In the government’s view, there are no rules that apply to their 
contact with the detainees.
125
  For example, the “no contact” rule of 
the various professional responsibility codes
126
 is ignored by the gov-
ernment.  Government officials continue to routinely interrogate 
clients even though they are represented by counsel.
127
  The interro-
gators’ likely justification is that they are not purposely looking for 
 
 120 The federal U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia has issued protec-
tive orders prohibiting detainee lawyers from discussing classified information with 
their clients, and effectively limiting communication with clients.  See Protective Or-
der and Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainees at the United States Naval Base 
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, In re Guantanamo Detainee Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 143 
(D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Protective Order].     
 121 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 463–67 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].  
 122  For a detailed discussion of the protective order procedures see generally 
Brendan M. Driscoll, Note, The Guantánamo Protective Order, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
873 (2007).  The privilege team is a team of government lawyers who are not partici-
pating in any of the litigation who review various documents for classified informa-
tion.  They are prohibited from communicating with the government lawyers han-
dling the habeas cases.  Imagine trying to explain to a client the concept of a 
privilege team.  
 123  See Protective Order, supra note 120.  Though the lawyers are from many 
states, including Hawaii—in addition to other countries such as the United King-
dom—there is only one “secure facility” and it is located in the Washington D.C. 
area. 
 124 See id. at 154. 
 125 See id.  
 126 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (2007). 
 127 The subject of interrogation is complex because most detainees were subject to 
at least three different types of interrogation: the first often accompanied by the use 
of enhanced interrogation techniques; the second interrogation over time by law en-
forcement agents in an effort to sanitize the earlier coerced statements; and finally, 
interrogations for intelligence information, which continue to occur to this day.    
COHEN_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2011  9:16 AM 
2011] LAWYERING IN A VACUUM 1445 
 
incriminating information; rather, they are looking for intelligence. 
Many detainees are resistant to trusting an American legal advocate 
because of the nature of their detention (i.e., they are being detained 
by the U.S. government) as well as the circumstances under which 
they were captured.   
The detainees brought to Guantánamo did not arrive at a tradi-
tional prison; they arrived at an interrogation facility.
128
  Some cap-
tives were starved before being transported to Guantánamo, then sub-
jected to beatings, and deprived of sleep once they got there.
129
  One 
prisoner, Abu Zubaydah, was held for four and a half years in a secret 
Central Intelligence Agency prison before being transferred to Guan-
tánamo where he endured waterboarding torture eighty-three 
times.
130
 
Moreover, many detainees who were subjected to “enhanced in-
terrogation techniques” suffer from severe PTSD
131
 or continuing 
stress disorder.
132
  With specific regard to torture, “[m]ost trauma ex-
perts . . . agree that the psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD is relevant for 
torture survivors.”
133
  Psychological symptoms exhibited by torture 
survivors (e.g., anxiety, depression, irritability and/or aggressiveness, 
emotional instability, self-isolation or social withdrawal, and angry 
outbursts) match closely the symptoms of PTSD.
134
  One of the conse-
quences of enhanced interrogation techniques is PTSD and a conse-
quence of that, which I have personally observed, is an emergence of 
behavioral issues. Though the government attributes certain beha-
 
 128 Luban, supra note 36, at 2022.  
 129 Frakt, supra note 59, at 385. 
 130 Worthington, Hidden Horrors, supra note 52.    
 131 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 121, at 463. 
 132 Id.  Although active torture (physical and mental) is no longer present at 
Guantánamo, detainees are still held by the people who conducted the torture, still 
in the same location, still subjected to isolation, and still interrogated.      
 133 Mark Costanzo et al., Psychologists and the Use of Torture in Interrogations, 5 
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 7, 13 (2007). 
 134 DSM-IV-TR states the following regarding PTSD:  
The individual [suffering from PTSD] has persistent symptoms of an-
xiety or increased arousal that were not present before the trauma.  
These symptoms may include difficulty falling or staying asleep that 
may be due to recurrent nightmares during which the traumatic event 
is relived, hypervigilance, and exaggerated startle response.  Some in-
dividuals report irritability or outbursts of anger or difficulty concen-
trating or completing tasks.  
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 121, at 463–67.   
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vioral issues, such as self destructive behavior, throwing of feces,
135
 
and angry outbursts, to anti-American activity, a much more likely 
explanation is the triggering of PTSD.
136
  Failure to recognize the dif-
ference will disadvantage those detainees who are sick as opposed to 
those detainees whose political beliefs are antagonistic to the West. 
How does the lawyer learn from the client, who suffers from 
PTSD, what he told the authorities, and how he was treated during 
the interrogation?  Flashbacks are common because these expe-
riences are often re-lived during retelling, and thus, it is not unusual 
for the client not to be able to relate much information even after 
several years.  So in those circumstances, the lawyer has little choice 
except to wait.  Even when the client can tell some of the story, it can 
be unbearable to watch and hear. 
The presence of severe PTSD can create a condition of “dimi-
nished capacity” within the meaning of Rule 1.14 of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the sole ethical rule that refers to a 
client’s mental health status.
137
  The combined circumstances and li-
mitations affecting the client, as discussed, may justify the lawyer tak-
ing protective action.  The rule permits a lawyer to act when a client’s 
 
 135 Charlie Savage et al., Details of Lives in an American Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2011, at A1. 
 136  Bob Egelko, Ex-Guantanamo Inmates Studied, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 17, 2008, at 
A4 (“[T]wo-thirds of former prisoners interviewed between July 2007 and July 2008 
suffered from psychological problems, including nightmares, angry outbursts, with-
drawal and depression.”). 
 137 Rule 1.14 provides the following:  
(a) When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered decisions 
in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of 
minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer 
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship with the client. 
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished 
capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless 
action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, 
the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including 
consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take ac-
tion to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. 
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with dimi-
nished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action 
pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under 
Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the ex-
tent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.14 (2002). 
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“capacity to make adequately considered decisions . . . is diminished” 
because of “mental impairment or for some other reason.”
138
 
Determining whether a client with a possible case of PTSD has 
diminished mental capacity can prove challenging for lawyers in gen-
eral,
139
 and these difficulties are compounded at Guantánamo.  Be-
cause the ABA provides little guidance to lawyers attempting to de-
termine whether a client may have diminished capacity,
140
 a lawyer’s 
determination is often based on the totality of interactions with the 
client.
141
  Clearly, this process is very difficult for Guantánamo defense 
lawyers because they have such limited access to their clients.  Law-
yers representing Guantánamo detainees are therefore often left 
without a full understanding of their clients’ mental state, which se-
riously compromises their ability to provide adequate representa-
tion.
142
 
Rule 1.14 permits the lawyer to act when the lawyer reasonably 
believes the client has diminished capacity and cannot act in her own 
best interests.
143
  The lawyer can take reasonably necessary protective 
action.
144
  Many of the clients have been subjected to torture and suf-
fer from PTSD.  Is PTSD diminished capacity and thus a disability 
within the meaning of Rule 1.14?  Of course the answer is “it de-
pends.”  It depends on the depth and extent of its effect on the client 
and, in particular, how it impacts the client’s communication abilities 
and his capacity to think rationally.
145
  In view of the fact of torture, 
dissimilarity in cultures, the lack of access to the client, and the 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 See Carol M. Suzuki, When Something is Not Quite Right: Considerations for Advising 
a Client to Seek Mental Health Treatment, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 209, 218–20 
(2009). 
 140 The ABA has attempted to offer more direction in recent years, but the lawyer 
is still responsible for identifying whether the client has diminished mental capacity.  
See Evan R. Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
to Enhance Client Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 202 
MIL. L. REV. 185, 214–18 (2009). 
 141 Id. at 206 n.96. 
 142 Some lawyers have sought and received permission from a habeas judge to 
have the client examined by a forensic psychologist.  Such an examination has 
proved to be extremely useful for a better understanding of the client.  It would also 
be useful in the habeas cases and in the military commission cases, if and when 
brought. 
 143 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.14 (2002). 
 144 Id. 
 145 See James A. Cohen, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules, and the Impaired 
Criminal Defendant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 573–79 (1998). 
COHEN_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2011  9:16 AM 
1448 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1427 
 
client’s lack of familiarity with U.S. legal concepts, lawyers for detai-
nees should consider stepping in to protect the client’s interests. 
For those few who have been charged, their lawyers’ ability to ef-
fectively do their job is compromised at every step of the process.  
Once a detainee is in civilian court or before a military commission, a 
judge might prevent him from answering certain questions on the 
stand for fear that the detainee may reveal classified interrogation 
techniques and/or classified information.
146
  Lawyers are also pre-
vented from discussing classified information with their clients.
147
  
“Classified” has been defined as 
anything written or oral that the government has in its possession 
or has ever had in its possession that it marks as classified or tells 
the attorney is classified; this includes most of the information re-
lating to the facts of the client’s detainment and information ne-
cessary to defend the client.
148
  
Besides infringing on a detainee’s right to due process, the gov-
ernment compromises a lawyer’s ability to be an effective advocate.  
The lawyers are prohibited from disclosing classified information 
with the client even if the client was the source of the information un-
less the court or the government attorney consents.
149
  Work product 
is sent to a privilege team for governmental review, then a redacted 
version is returned to the lawyer so that classified information does 
not appear in any document
150
 not housed in the secure facility.
151
  
The government justifies circumventing attorney-client privilege by 
reasoning that because the government attorney does not have access 
to the documents, the privileged relationship is not violated.
152
  How-
ever, in practice, this inhibits the detainee’s willingness to disclose in-
formation to his attorney for fear of government observation, which 
in turn limits the lawyer’s ability to effectively represent her client.
153
 
 
 146 See Frakt, supra note 59, at 397. 
 147 Luban, supra note 36, at 1994. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See Frakt, supra note 59, at 397. 
 150 Honigsberg, supra note 47, at 105; see also Protective Order, supra note 122, ¶ 
6.   
 151 Court papers containing classified material must be prepared at the secure fa-
cility.  H. Candace Gorman, Filing Court Papers, Guantanamo Style, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 12, 2007, 4:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/h-candace-gorman-
/filing-court-papers-guant_b_45703.html.  
 152 Honigsberg, supra note 48, at 105.  
 153 Id.  
COHEN_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2011  9:16 AM 
2011] LAWYERING IN A VACUUM 1449 
 
Communication with other lawyers is also restricted in unusual 
ways.  In most circumstances, lawyers informally discuss cases, clients, 
judges, adversaries, and legal and factual matters.  In Guantánamo 
matters, despite having security clearance, we are only allowed to dis-
cuss matters pertaining to other detainees’ individual situations if 
they are directly relevant to the representation of our client.154 
The discovery process in habeas cases and in military commis-
sion cases has been hindered because the government is sometimes 
unwilling to produce documents, ignores discovery requests, sends 
last-minute discovery “dumps” when a military commission finally 
gives the government a deadline, and loses or destroys evidence.
155
  
The government creates so many challenges for the detainee lawyers 
because Guantánamo is, first and foremost, an interrogation facility, 
and the role of the lawyer, typically, is to prevent the interrogator 
from getting information from his client.
156
  A testament to the suc-
cess of these obstacles is that many detainees ultimately refuse repre-
sentation.
157
 
IV. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
If I were to start all over again, what would I do differently?  
Though much of what occurred was beyond my and the other law-
yers’ control, I would strive to learn more about where the clients 
came from and who they are.  Not just the clients’ backgrounds 
(about which I did learn), but about their countries of origin, other 
countries in the region, the religion of Islam, the economy and poli-
tics in the region, the system of law as it exists in theory and how it is 
actually applied, and their culture.  Because the law and process were 
so uncertain, I had little to tell the clients; as a result, I stayed away.  
Had I to do it again, I would have tried to spend much more time 
with the clients early on, even though the logistics were difficult. 
I also should have paid more attention to the clients’ state of 
mind and mental health.  In addition to being in custody without 
changes for a term without apparent end, clients were tortured and 
 
 154 See Protective Order, supra note 120, ¶ 29 (“Petitioners’ counsel shall not dis-
close to a petitioner-detainee classified information not provided by that petitioner-
detainee.  Should a petitioner’s counsel desire to disclose classified information not 
provided by a petitioner-detainee to that petitioner-detainee, that petitioner’s coun-
sel will provide in writing to the privilege review team . . . .” (internal citations omit-
ted)). 
 155 Frakt, supra note 59, at 394–95. 
 156 See Luban, supra note 36, at 2022. 
 157 See Frakt, supra note 59, at 382. 
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kept in isolation.  Their conditions caused mental illness to which I 
should have been more aware. 
 
